

CHINESE ATTITUDINAL REACTIONS
TO FORCED COMPLIANCE:
A CROSS-CULTURAL EXPERIMENT IN
THE THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

"When people are subdued by force
they do not submit in heart.
They submit because their strength
is not adequate to resist.
But when they are subdued by virtue,
they are pleased in their inner hearts,
and they submit sincerely."-----
Mencius (II, i, 3) Chinese philosopher, circa 300 B.C.

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Prefatory Remarks

This paper is a report of experimental research on Chinese psychological reactions to forced compliance conducted by the author in Hong Kong between the months of January and October 1964. It represents an attempt to provide empirical answers to the questions posed by two mutually contradictory theories pertinent to Chinese reactions in a forced compliance situation, viz. the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and a Characterological Theory about Chinese behavior. All subjects participating in the experiment were adult refugees from Communist China; and contrary to conventional practice the experiment was not conducted in a classroom or university setting but in a business office in downtown Kowloon. The analysis and write-up of these data were then completed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The author wishes to express his particular appreciation to Dr. William Rodd and Dr. Zing Yang Kuo for their assistance in making such a psychological experiment feasible in the complex setting of Hong Kong.

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CHINESE ATTITUDINAL REACTIONS TO FORCED COMPLIANCE

Introduction

In Communist China today the broad masses of the population spend hours each week participating in study groups, struggle meetings, and campaign meetings organized by the Communist cadres. A common characteristic of all of these meetings for many of the participants is that they are induced by the cadre to make statements before their peers which are discrepant with their private opinions. To select an example from the recent campaign on "Socialist Education", many of the people were required to repeat this slogan: "Raise up high the Red Flag of Chairman Mao's thought; and arm your brain with the Chairman's thought; and you will have the panacea to solve your problems, and the master key to all your undertakings." In view of the debacle of the previous Great Leap Forward sponsored by Mao Tse-tung and the consequent famine in 1961, this was clearly a discrepant utterance for most of the people.

What we wish to examine here is the psychological effect on the participants of one aspect of this situation: What is the attitudinal effect on Chinese of making a public statement contrary to private opinion under inducement by an authority figure?

There exist in the realm of social science at least two theories which have something to say by way of explanation about

the reactions of people in such a "forced compliance" situation. The first is the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, '57) which deals with how human beings tend to maintain consistency between their cognitions, evaluations, and behaviors, and which has been extensively tested and supported by experiments with American subjects. The second is a characterological theory about Chinese. Following the outline proposed by Inkle and Levinson ('54) for the study of national character, we have gathered together propositions about what is characteristic for the modal Chinese personality on three basic psychological issues: conception of self; relation to authority; and ways of dealing with primary conflicts. What we hope to develop here is an experimental test of these two different theoretical positions on Chinese attitudinal reactions to forced compliance.

I. Dissonance Theory

A. Existence of Dissonance

Dissonance theory is based on the tendency of people to maintain consistency between their cognitions, evaluations, and behaviors. Pairs of cognitive elements can exist in irrelevant, consonant or dissonant relations. Two cognitive elements are in an irrelevant relation if they have nothing to do with each other. Two cognitive elements are in consonant relation if, considering these two alone, one element follows from the other. Two cognitive elements are in dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other, i.e., x and y are dissonant if not x follows from y.

B. Magnitude of Dissonance

The total magnitude of dissonance which exists between two clusters of cognitive elements is a function of the weighted proportion of all relevant relations between the two clusters which are dissonant, each dissonant or consonant relation being weighted according to the importance of the elements involved in that relation, i.e., $M = f \left(\frac{\sum id}{\sum id + \sum ic} \right)$.

The magnitude of dissonance or consonance which exists between two cognitive elements is a direct function of the importance of these two elements.

C. Modes of Dissonance Reduction

The main hypothesis of the theory is that the existence of dissonance of a given magnitude sets up a corresponding pressure on the person to reduce that dissonance. Festinger (57) states

three major modes of dissonance reduction:

- a) By changing one or more of the elements involved in dissonant relations. (denial, differentiation).
- b) By adding new cognitive elements that are consonant with already existing cognition (bolstering).
- c) By decreasing the importance of the elements involved in the dissonant relations (or increasing the importance of the elements involved in the consonant relations).

D. Psychologic of Dissonance

The ambiguity, or flexibility, of the theory lies in the phrase "follows from" in the definition of dissonant relations. The specification of "follows from" involves specification of the operations by means of which one can say that for a given person, element not-x follows from element y. One empirical way of determining the "follows from" relation between cognitions x and y for a person is ascertaining by questioning or observation if the expectation that y is true "sets up the expectation that" x is false. One element may follow from another because of logic, because of cultural mores, because of the things one has experienced and learned, and perhaps in other senses. Our primary interest here is with rules for the determination of psychological implications that are bound up with cultural mores.

From experimentation with American subjects support has been lent to four general conditions as dissonance provoking.

- 1) Postdecision dissonance. The first condition deals with the maintenance of value consistency within a person after making a decision. Here the cognitive elements corresponding to the positive characteristics of the rejected alternative and those corresponding to the negative characteristics of the chosen

alternative are dissonant with the knowledge of the action that has been taken.

- 2) Dissonances due to social unsupport. This condition deals with the maintenance of opinion consistency between associated people. The knowledge that some other person generally like oneself holds one opinion is dissonant with holding a contrary opinion.
- 3) Dissonance due to exposure to new information. This condition refers to the maintenance of opinion consistency within a person. It points out that voluntary or involuntary exposure to new information can serve to provoke dissonance between previously held opinions and the new information received.
- 4) Dissonance due to forced compliance. This condition refers to the maintenance of consistency within a person between his opinions and cognitions of his own actions. Whenever reward is promised or punishment is threatened in an attempt to induce a person to act in a way that is contrary to his private opinion, dissonance is provoked. If the overt action is successfully elicited, the person's private opinion is dissonant with his knowledge concerning his behavior; similarly, his knowledge of the reward obtained or the punishment avoided is consonant with his knowledge concerning his behavior. If the overt behavior is not successfully elicited, then his private opinion is consonant with his knowledge of what he has done, but the knowledge of the reward not obtained or the punishment to be suffered is dissonant with his knowledge of what he has done. To take an example, if a distraught Chinese worker really believes that Mao's directive for the construction of backyard blast furnaces is a hare-brained scheme, and if this same Chinese stands up in his weekly study meeting at the behest of the cadre who controls his job and effusively praises Mao's grandiose plan, he should experience tension due to dissonance between his private opinion and his public statement. Let us codify our example more succinctly in terms of the definition of dissonance: other things being equal, the fact that Worker Chen believes Mao's plan for socialist construction is unfeasible psychologically implies that worker Chen does not stand up before his co-workers and affirm that Mao's plan is feasible and wise. If he does, his private opinion stands in dissonant relation to his overt behavior.

Since the situation of "forced compliance" has particularly interesting experimentation associated with it, we will

pursue some propositions on the magnitude and nature of reduction of the dissonance existing under this condition. By forced compliance we mean public compliance without private acceptance. To distinguish operationally between overt compliance and private opinion one should remove the source of the pressure to comply and assess the attitude under conditions of guaranteed anonymity.

The magnitude of the dissonance resulting from an attempt to elicit forced compliance is greatest if the promised reward or the threatened punishment is either just sufficient to elicit the overt behavior or is just barely not sufficient to elicit it. If forced compliance is elicited, the magnitude of dissonance decreases as the magnitude of punishment or reward increases. If the forced compliance fails to be elicited, the magnitude of the dissonance increases as the magnitude of the reward or punishment increases. In our example, if the cadre had intimated to the worker that he would get a \$20 dollar monthly raise for a good performance with his statements in the study group and if the worker made the speech with this promise in mind, he would presumably experience less dissonance for his actions than would be the case if the cadre had only promised him one extra catty in his monthly rice rations. In the former case, the worker would be able to rationalize the discrepancy between his public statement and his private opinion because of the addition of a significant element that was consonant with his overt behavior, viz. more salary. He might then reason that making such statements under these conditions did not imply that he really believed them, only that he could use the extra money. In the latter case our worker would have a more difficult time rationalizing his actions in terms of financial remuneration; he would be more prone to persuade himself that he said what he did because he really believed it.

The modes of dissonance reduction for forced compliance are as follows: If elicited, reduction can be achieved by changing private opinion to bring it into line with the overt behavior, or by magnifying the amount of reward or punishment involved, and if not elicited, reduction can be achieved by intensifying the original private opinion or by minimizing the reward or punishment involved. The general means of providing new cognition in dissonance reduction remain: seeking new information, seeking opinions from other persons, changing one's own behavior when it is a source of relevant cognitions, selectively perceiving or selectively remembering events. Which mode is selected for dissonance reduction depends upon the relative availability of these general means of reduction and upon the relative resistance to change of relevant cognitive elements. The major sources of this resistance to change are the responsiveness of the element to "reality", physical or social,

and the extent to which the element exists in consonant relations with other elements. Finally, the maximum dissonance which can exist between two elements is equal to the resistance to change of the less resistant element.

The chart on the following page summarizes seven experiments performed on American subjects under a wide variety of situations which support the dissonance theoretical predictions for attitudinal reactions to forced compliance by bearing out the following two empirical generalizations: a) making a public statement contrary to one's private opinion produces attitude change in the direction expressed in the public statement; b) the greater the inducement to perform such an act, the less the consequent attitude change.

The general paradigm of these studies has been the following: An experimenter (invariably a research psychologist) employs variable levels of inducement (money, gifts, or verbal justification) to persuade subjects (invariably students) to make public statements (orally or in writing) about an object (from summer vacations to police brutality) which are in direct contradiction to the subjects' own private attitudes toward the object. Following the making of counter-attitudinal statements, the subjects' attitudes (toward the object or toward the unpleasant task itself) are assessed by questionnaire (anonymous or otherwise). Statistical comparisons are made (between before-task and after-task attitudes or between the attitudes expressed by the variable inducement groups and a control group). Observation is made of after-task attitudes as a function of the level of inducement employed to elicit the counter-attitudinal statements.

DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTS PERFORMED WITH AMERICAN SUBJECTS SUPPORTING BOTH OF THE
FOLLOWING EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATIONS

- 1) Making a public statement contrary to one's private opinion produces attitude change in the direction expressed in the public statement.
- 2) The greater the inducement to perform such an act, the less the consequent attitude change.

EXPERIMENT	DESIGN	OPINION ASSESSMENT	ELICITED STATEMENT	ATTITUDE OBJECT	INDUCEMENT
Kelman '53	Before (1-2 days) After (1 week). 7th grade children in classroom.	By anonymous questionnaire.	Essay for or against jungle comics.	Preference for jungle comic books over fantas- tic hero comic books.	Variable gift, contingent upon supporting jungle comics. Low: Chance of book. High: Certainty of book and movie ticket.
Brehm '57 (reported in Cohen '60).	Before (1 week) and After with controls. Junior high school students.	By anonymous questionnaire	Essay for shortening summer vacations.	Attitude toward shortening summer vacations.	Variable gift. Low: Any one of phonograph record, movie ticket, or ticket to skating rink. Medium: Any two of above. High: Any four of above.
Feastinger and Carlsmith '59.	After only. With controls. College students in a laboratory.	By telling a non-partison person.	Tell next sub- ject that exper- iment is "lots of fun" and argue for that position.	Liking for a boring one-hour test of manual dexterity.	Variable amount of money. Low: \$1.00. High: \$20.00.

EXPERIMENT	DESIGN	OPINION ASSESSMENT	ELICITED STATEMENT	ATTITUDE OBJECT	INDUCEMENT
Brehm and Cohen '62 (pp. 73-78)	After only. With controls. College students in dormitory.	By questionnaire.	Essay supporting actions of the New Haven police.	Justifiability of police actions in view of student accusations of police brutality in a recent riot at Yale.	Variable amount of money. Low: \$0.50. Med. Low: \$1.00. Med. Hi: \$5.00. High: \$10.00 promised but not actually paid to subjects.
Cohen, Brehm and Fleming '58.	Before and After. College students in a classroom.	By questionnaire.	Essay favoring co-education.	Attitude toward admitting co-eds to Yale.	Variable justification. Low: None High: Experimenters claim that results will be very useful to psychological science.
Rabbie, Brehm and Cohen '59.	Before and After. Pre-test assessment of attitude. College students	By questionnaire.	Essay favoring elimination of inter-collegiate athletics.	Attitude toward elimination of inter-collegiate athletics.	Variable justification. Low: Minimal justification. High: Multiple reasons for writing essay.

EXPERIMENT	DESIGN	OPINION ASSESSMENT	ELICITED STATEMENT	ATTITUDE OBJECT	INDUCEMENT
Brock and Blackwood '62.	After only. With controls. College students	By questionnaire.	Decision to write essay in favor of tuition increase.	Attitude towards proposal to increase tuition by \$10.00 per credit.	Variable justification. Low: None. High: Stress personal value of seeing both sides of an issue and value to science of data in essays.

Following an extensive search of the literature on forced compliance dissonance, the author is aware of only one study containing experimental results for American subjects which contradict these generalizations derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance. Rosenberg ('64) replicated the experiment of Brehm and Cohen ('62) with one important difference: a conscious effort was made to separate dissonance arousal from subsequent attitude measurement by having the opinion assessment conducted by an investigator from a different academic department who was allegedly engaged in a different study from the experimenter who actually gave monetary reward to the subjects for counter-attitudinal arguments. In addition, assessment of the opinion item in question was masked in a questionnaire containing eight other items.

Rosenberg separates these two parts of the experimental procedure in order to eliminate or reduce "evaluation apprehension" which a subject presumably feels when engaged in an experiment conducted by a psychologist. This "evaluation apprehension" allegedly contaminates the results of forced compliance dissonance experiments because there is more suspicion as to the true purposes of these experiments created in the high reward groups (low dissonance) than in the low reward groups where the subject does not have the feeling of being "bought off". Rosenberg's prediction from the reinforcement position is that under the conditions of reduced "evaluation apprehension", the greater the reward for making a counter-attitudinal argument, the greater the consequent

attitude change. His results do in fact bear out his prediction in reversing the findings of Brehm and Cohen ('62): When compared with the control group, attitude change following counter-attitudinal argument was greatest for the high reward group (\$5.00) and least for the low reward groups (\$0.50 and \$1.00). Reinforcement theory's explanation of these results follows the learning theoretical principle that the greater the reward for a given behavior, the greater the likelihood that that behavior or similar behaviors will be repeated in the future (Scott '57, '59).

**DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT PERFORMED WITH AMERICAN SUBJECTS
QUALIFYING EMPIRICAL GENERALIZATION (2)**

- (2A) Under conditions of reduced "evaluation apprehension" (by perceptual separation of dissonance arousal from subsequent attitude measurement), the greater the reward for making a counter-attitudinal statement, the greater the consequent attitude change.

EXPERIMENT	DESIGN	OPINION ASSESSMENT	ELICITED STATEMENT	ATTITUDE OBJECT	INDUCEMENT
Rosenberg '64 (replication of Brehm and Cohen '62 with separation of dissonance arousal and opinion assessment)	After only. With controls. College students.	By one item on eight item questionnaire administered by a separate investigator (from different department and on different project) from inducing agent who elicited statement.	Essay favoring non-participation of university in Rose Bowl competition.	Justifiability of hypothetical university decision to disallow football team to participate in Rose Bowl competition.	Variable amount of money: Low: \$0.50 Medium: \$1.00 High: \$5.00 Actually paid to subjects.

II. Characterological Theory

The characterological theory is really a quasi-theory pieced together from the writings of anthropologists and "old China hands" on the behavior characteristics of Chinese resulting from their socialization in the Confucian patterns. Inkles and Levinson ('54) have stressed that any theory of national character should delineate the role of national character in the functioning of the social system as a whole by taking account of such sociological constructs as status position, role, role models, mechanisms to prevent deviance from norms, and the social sanctions of guilt, shame, and applied punishment or reward. The main ingredient of this theory is the Confucian code which has held sway in China for over 2000 years. We can lay out the fundamental elements of social relations prescribed by Confucianists by considering the main values, groups, and role relationships in terms of behavioral orientation. The chief considerations in describing the social relations between a pair of roles are first of all whether the role incumbents are members of the same group (family or friendship circle) and secondly, whether one of the role incumbents is dominant, as determined chiefly by his age, sex and education. To a large degree these two considerations determine what is the proper behavioral orientation prescribed by the Code. As the summary chart on the following page indicates, to members of one's own reference group (family or circle of friends) one interacts with trust, intimacy, and loyalty; to those not members of one's own group one interacts with propriety, superficiality and politeness. To those exercising authority over one, the reaction is one of total submission; to those with no

authority, the reaction is one of competition. The code itself takes the role relations in the family as the basic model from which role orientations outside the family are derived. (Here, as elsewhere, we note that Chinese place much stress on learning by analogy from a basic personal model.)

ROLE RELATIONSHIPS
PROSCRIBED BY CONFUCIAN CODE

Association	Dominance		Role Orientation
	Authority	Equality	
In-group	Father > Son	Friend = Friend	Loyalty, trust, intimacy.
	Elder brother > Younger brother	Sister = Sister	
Out-group	Husband > Wife		Propriety, Superficiality, politeness.
	Ruler > Subject	Student = Student	
	Educated > Uneducated person	Peasant = Peasant	
	Scholar > Peasant etc.	Scholar = Scholar etc.	
Submission		Competition	
Basic Social Values Determining Status:		male > female	
		age > youth	
		educated > uneducated	

In considering what is characteristic for the modal Chinese personality on the three basic psychological issues of conception of self, relation to authority, and handling of primary conflicts we find that we must concern ourselves with three inter-related formal elements of the Confucian Code: Lyan (face)*; Hsiao (filial piety); and Li (proper conduct according to status). The formula relating these elements is the following: Any transgression of the li by an individual results in loss of lyan, which is a mechanism by which one's accumulated moral and social prestige in the eyes of the community is lowered (Fairbank '62). Hsiao is the main proscription of the Li and deals with proper behavior before authority. We shall see that the behavioral implications of these elements are the following, respectively: Where Americans profess a rugged individualism, Chinese submerge their identity into a small group of close associates, relatives and family members, viewing the responsibility for an individual's actions as resting with his group and valuing personal loyalty more than universal principle; where Americans believe that a man should stand up for his human rights, that all men are judged equal under a universal law, that an authority is limited and can issue directives only over limited and circumscribed aspects of behavior, Chinese are excessively submissive to authority and believe that it is not functionally specific but totalistic in scope; where Americans tend to be casual and candid in their relations with other, Chinese are excessively concerned with the proper form prescribed by the situation and the roles involved in it and less apt to

* Lyan (face) is not actually present as a concept in the writings of Confucious, but it is an implicit behavior pattern resulting from adherence to his code.

display open expression of their true inner feelings. Let us now look at each of these three elements and their significance for Chinese behavioral orientations in more detail.

- A. The identity and felt moral worth of a Chinese is closely bound up with the opinions that his family and his small group of friends have of him. His moral worth is assessed more on the basis of personal loyalty to his group and less on the basis of adherence to universal principles of good and bad than is the case for Americans.

Lian, as a concept, has been well defined by Hu ('44). She defines it as follows by distinguishing two kinds of "face."

"Verbally the two sets of criteria are distinguished by two words which on the physical level both mean "face." One of these, Mien-tzu, stands for the kind of prestige that is emphasized in this country: a reputation achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation.....the other kind of "face," Lien, is also known to Americans without being accorded formal recognition. It is the respect of the group for a man with a good moral reputation; the man who will fulfill his obligations regardless of the hardships involved, who under all circumstances shows himself a decent human being. It represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego's moral character, the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function properly within the community. Lien is both a social sanction and an internalized sanction."

The importance of face to a Chinese cannot be overemphasized. Intermediaries are often used to buffer the relations between two persons so that neither would risk the loss of face through direct personal confrontation.* Losing face can cause one to drop seriously in his self esteem, in his conception of himself as a moral person, often to the extent of committing suicide.

*Yang ('45) has provided a description of the social factors affecting loss of face which fits well with our description of

(* cont.)- the role relationships proscribed by the Confucian code and adds a dynamic aspect to it. He points out as basic considerations the social equality or inequality of the pair of opponents in a face situation, the degree of intimacy (in-group or out-group membership) of the opponents or witness to a dispute, the social value attached to the particular face offence as a determinant of the appropriate sanction, and a psychological factor of "sensitivity to face." We can codify his statements into propositions as follows: If a high status Chinese requests a favor of a low status Chinese and is refused, then the former loses face; if a low asks a high for a favor and is refused, then there is no loss of face involved. If a high status Chinese asks another high status Chinese for a favor and the latter refuses, then the former loses face; if a low asks a low and is refused, then there is no loss of face involved. In the case of insult or prestige defeat, if high insults low, then no loss of face; if low insults high, then high loses face (provided the insulting one is not too low in status, in which case the incident would be ignored. If high defeats high, then there is no loss of face involved. We can summarize these effects of status pairs on the possibility of losing face in tabular form.

Status			Status		
refused request	high	low	insult is defeated	high	low
makes request					
high	loses face	loses face	high	0	loses face
low	0	0	low	0	(0)

Thus it appears that only relatively high status persons run the risk of losing face in an encounter, and then most likely in the case where he is confronted with a person just below him in status.

The presence of a witness is a necessary condition for loss of face to result from an encounter; and conversely face can only be restored in the presence of witnesses such as at a public meeting. If the witness is quite intimate with either of the opposing parties (e.g. another family member) then the defeated or insulted party does not feel loss of face; if the witness is not intimate with either of the parties (e.g. in-laws, or what's worse outsiders in the village or community) then the defeated party does lose face, provided only that the witness is not a complete stranger. The greater the offence in terms of the social value violated (filial piety being the greatest) the more face lost, provided the offence is not entirely petty, in which case no face is lost. Some individuals are more sensitive thence more vulnerable to face considerations than others. This vulnerability seems to be greatest among the middle-aged, the young having little face to lose, the old excusing their transgressions by virtue of their age.

This process is catalyzed by the ostracism of the offender by his circle of friends, his all-encompassing reference group if you will.

As Hu ('44) put it:

Tiu-lien "to lose lien" is a condemnation by the group for immoral or socially disagreeable behavior. A serious infraction of the moral code of society, once come to the notice of the public, is a blemish on the character of the individual and excites a great deal of comment. A fraud detected, a crime exposed, meanness, poor judgement, lies told for one's own profit, unfaithfulness while in office, a broken promise, the cheating of a customer, a married man making love to a young girl, these are just some of the acts that incur the criticism of society, and are rated as "losing lien" for ego.

Notice that the Chinese conception of "losing face" is not equivalent to the Westerner's conception of "sinning." The concept of face goes beyond moral goodness or badness to include the qualities of good judgement and rationality; the conception of human nature as inherently evil is absent in Chinese culture.

LeBarre ('46) has provided us with a summary psychoanalytic description of the character structure of the average Chinese which emphasizes their lack of reliance upon universalistic, internalized principles of right and wrong:

"...they lack any strong visceral disciplines, such as are so insistent and strong in the "Protestant ethic"....The internalization of the superego is weak, the sense of sin nearly absent. The id demands almost uniformly secure undeterred physiological gratification, and libidinal tensions are low. The ego is sturdy and reality oriented in the direction of the physical world, but in the patriarchal family, it is relatively thin skinned in its response to the human world. The average Chinese is cheerful, dignified, discreet, poised, unanxious, proud, secure, realistic, and kindly."

B. Chinese, as compared with Americans, assume a posture towards authority which is extremely submissive and readily compliant. The scope of authority accepted by a Chinese is

much broader and less delimited than that acceptable to Americans. The authority relationship is personalistic according to undifferentiated status rather than legalistic, according to universal principle.

Hsiao or filial piety is the root of all proper relations to authority and has its genesis in the family in the relation of the son to his father. Kuo ('64) writes:

"The philosophy of Hsiao implies several important concepts, educational and ethical:" (1) the most important of all is the view that Hsiao is the basic principle from which all other types of ethical behavior are derived. Thus, "Hsiao is the foundation of all other virtues on which all the education of the individual must be based..." (from Hsiao Chin) "If one is not loyal to the sovereign, one is not Hsiao; if one is not respectful to his superiors, one is not Hsiao; if one is not honest to one's friends, one is not Hsiao; if one is not courageous in battle, one is not Hsiao..." In other words, all the ethical values of one's social behavior outside the family are originated from, or extensions of, the main concept of "Hsiao." (Kuo, 64)

To cite another scholar, Hsu ('49) states:

"It would be no exaggeration to say that it (Hsiao) is the measuring stick of all behavior and worth of the individual."

Taking the relationship of father to son as a model, Hsiao is extended by analogy to pervade all social relationships involving authority.

"What is most essential is its (Hsiao) perpetual permeation, conscious or unconscious, for two thousand years, in every form of behavior of the individual. The relations between the teachers and pupils, between senior persons and the young, between officials and the common peoples, between sovereign and his subjects, between arts and craftsmen and apprentices, etc, were expressed in terms of the father-and-son relationship. The relations between students and students or between persons of similar age or similar positions etc., were expressed in terms of relations between brothers or between sisters." (Kuo)

The main behavior pattern prescribed by Hsiao is total submission to authority based on the model of a filial son submitting to a

despotic father.

"Docility, submission and compliance are the natural outcome of the submergence of the individual to the patrilistic interest of the family under the despotic rule of the father. Note these two passages from Li Chi: "When one meets an elder person who ranks with one's father in seniority, one should not withdraw from him unless told to; one should stand silently, except in response to questions. This is the proper behavior of Hsiao"..."The South Western section of the house must be reserved for the elders, sons must not sit in the middle of the room, nor walk in the middle of a passage nor stand in the middle of the door."

"These are examples to show how a son of Hsiao should behave in his house in proper respect to his father or other elders. When a young person is brought up in such an environment, what other behavior patterns can we expect except docility, submission to authorities and absolute compliance with the commands of the father and other elders." (Kuo)

Another scholar in summing up an intensive study of a Chinese community states the following: regarding the basic Chinese personality configuration: "What is the effect of these cultural forces on the basic personality norm? As far as the overt behavior is concerned, the first outstanding quality is an explicitly submissive attitude toward authority." (Hsu, '49)

Yet another scholar has noted submissiveness to authority as a basic Chinese personality trait. Lasswell ('63) has termed this "Seeming compliance."

"From study of mechanisms of personality development we know that one of the least costly ways of coping with adverse pressures and of avoiding deep involvement is seeming compliance. By appearing to comply, it is usually possible to avoid deprivations ordinarily imposed upon outspoken rebels. Our hypothesis--and one that is richly documented--is that the Chinese personality system excels in strategies of seeming compliance whenever family propagation is believed to be furthered thereby."

Kuo ('64) has gone on to explain how this mechanism has developed out of the socialization of Chinese into their culture:

"The philosophers have stressed the view that since the human body comes from his parents, it is the primary duty of the son not to cause any injury to any part of his body so that upon his death, he may return his body to his parents (and ancestors) unharmed and undamaged. "The body, its hair, and skin all come from the parents. One must see to it that no part of the body is destroyed or damaged. This is the starting point of Hsiao (From Hsiao Chin)..

This is also a contributory factor for the docility and submissiveness of the Chinese masses, for to be docile or submissive is one way to avoid trouble which may lead to physical danger...This is the material aspect of Hsiao...To the philosophers of Hsiao these are of secondary importance only. For them, the primary aspect of Hsiao is its non-material or spiritual side which consists of two parts:

(a) positively, to be a son of Hsiao one must do all one could to make the parents happy, and endeavor to achieve special distinction so as to honor one's parents and ancestors.

(b) negatively, one must refrain from doing anything which may bring disgrace or even bodily danger to the parents and ancestors. This non-material view of Hsiao must be regarded as one of the historical factors which have created the psychology of "face" and submissiveness. And what Harold Lasswell has called "Seeming Compliance" to authorities, for to "lose face" will certainly dishonor one's parents as well as one's relatives, and resistance to authorities will certainly involve one's parents and even other relatives in danger."

As compared with Americans, Chinese are concerned more with preserving the proper form demanded by a social situation and less with the direct communication of underlying interests and emotions. Chinese are remarkably able to maintain a separation of overt formalism and covert emotion.

The Li as a code of behavior including Hsiao is quite rigid and strict, as we have seen. As a result one might expect some split to occur between one's overt behavior as prescribed by the code and one's inner emotional feelings. As Kuo ('64) states it:

"What they (scholars) fail to realize is the fact that in actual life the formalities of Li and Hsiao are stereotyped behavior patterns and as such not only are they devoid of any higher level ideals, or philosophical meanings, they also lack the truly human feelings."

In describing the treatment of emotion in Chinese culture, Pye ('65) notes that the whole culture is pervaded with a spirit of controlled emotion, unless one is rudely "backed into a corner", and then there typically occurs an explosion of pent-up righteous indignation. A visible example of this orientation is seen in the Chinese expression of dislike for any physical violence. With regard to the cognitive compartmentalization of inner emotion and overt behavior Pye has the following to say:

"We need only note here that there appears to be a close relationship between the practice of seeming compliance with parental authority and this quality of being strongly situationally oriented. For in developing the ability at seeming compliance with parental authority--which in itself was brought about by being situationally oriented--the Chinese has had to learn to divert emotional commitment from the forms of his actions. To be able to be truly guided only by the logic of the situation and to see clearly the potentialities of each new situation one must be able to separate feelings from action and to be able further to recognize that there can be the appearance of emotion without the passions of sentiment."

Kuo ('64) cites cheating and lying as a means of resolving the discrepancies between the strict proscriptions of the rigid code and one's inner emotions:

"With a person's interest centered at home, it happened so often that when the family interest came into direct conflict with outside society, he was apt, (if not taught) to develop a tendency to cheating and lying in order to protect the interest of the family. Even Confucius himself would rather have a son conceal his father's crime rather than have him testify in court against his father who stole a lamb.....Furthermore, in the traditional family there was very often a situation in which compliance with the orders of a father or elders was either unfeasible or much against the will of the young person whereas open

disobedience would be an act against Hsiao. Under such circumstances, the young person was frequently forced to solve his problem by cheating and lying."

It should be noted that the first reaction of a Chinese to a potentially conflictful situation is one of avoidance; only when constrained in the situation does he exhibit "seeming compliance" or resort to the necessary lie.

III. Testing the Two Theories

Dissonance theory deals with cognition and claims universal validity for homo sapiens. Yet, as we have seen, some of the "follows from" relations in the theory rest on culturally based premises. The Characterological theory cites what is unique about the culture into which Chinese are socialized. Both theories deal with reactions to the demands of authority in a "forced compliance" situation. It would, therefore, seem possible to devise an experimental test of the universality of the theory of cognitive dissonance against the cultural differences claimed by the Characterological theory for Chinese. An appropriate situation would seem to be one where Chinese subjects are given variable levels of positive inducement by an authority figure to make public statements contrary to their private beliefs, and where post-experimental measures are made of behavioral compliance and attitudinal change.

In such a situation, (1) dissonance theory would predict that there would be private attitudinal change in the direction advocated by the public statement, whereas the Characterological theory, noting the compliant nature of Chinese and their tendency to maintain separation between overt-formal and covert-emotional levels, would lead one to expect little or no attitude change due to forced compliance, at least under conditions where the Chinese subject is isolated from his reference group of close associates. However, genuine attitude change due to prestige suggestion is possible in this situation and the

prediction of the Characterological theory is not unequivocal for simple attitude change.

(2) Dissonance theory would predict that the greater the inducement to make the discrepant statements, the less the attitude change to bring one's private opinion into line with his public statement: the Characterological theory, for the reasons stated above, would lead one to expect that the greater the inducement, the greater the overt compliance, but that neither increased inducement nor consequent increased compliance would produce any significant effect on changing private attitudes.

(3) Dissonance theory would predict that the lower the inducement to make discrepant statements, given that the statements are made, the more likely is one to invent or recall arguments that are in line with one's public statements for the sake of reducing one's greater dissonance. The Characterological theory would lead one to expect that the lower the inducement to make discrepant statements, the less likely is one to invent or recall arguments that are in line with one's public statements for the sake of foregoing unnecessary compliance.

(4) Dissonance theory would predict that the lower the inducement to make discrepant statements, given that the statements are made, the greater the expressed liking for the task as a means of reducing greater dissonance. The Characterological theory would lead one to expect that there would be no difference in expressed liking for the task produced by different levels of inducement since the compliance reaction is a ritualized one devoid of much affect and since even if affect

is aroused, the Chinese are reluctant openly to express affect as a reflection of their true feelings.

(5) Dissonance theory would predict that the lower the inducement to make the discrepant statements, given that the statements are made, the higher the perceived magnitude of the reward involved in inducing the discrepant statements, for the sake of reducing greater dissonance. The Characterological theory would give no reason to expect any magnification of the reward except to the extent that an attempt is made to dissociate the value of the reward as a causal factor in their action in making discrepant statements, since behavior so motivated and discovered by relevant others could cause one to lose face among his associates.

IV. Procedure

The design of the experiment is after-only with a control group and two treatment groups. The experiment was carried out in Hong Kong during the summer of 1964 and the opinion issue involved was the subjects' estimate of the rice ration in China for the peasants in June of 1965.*

The task assigned to the treatment groups was making a 5 to 10 minute talk into a tape recorder following a six point outline and arguing for the point of view that the rice rations in China will decrease radically from the 1963 level, coming to the conclusion that they will decrease down to their 1961 level of 18 catties per month. Among the treatment groups, the low inducement group received a Chinese lantern as a gift, the wholesale value of which was four Hong Kong dollars (U.S. \$0.68); the high inducement group received a transistor radio, the wholesale value of which was thirty Hong Kong dollars (U.S. \$5.10) for their cooperation. The control group was also given the lantern.

The opinion measurement following the treatment for the two experimental groups and immediately following the treatment for the control group was a request for the subjects' own sincere

* In prior research the author had obtained from a relief agency statements of the real rice rations for 77 Chinese peasant refugees who escaped from Communist China between 1960 (23) and 1963 (24). Calculations on these data showed that the average ration for the Kwantung peasant male was 18 catties of rice per month at the low point in the summer of 1961 and 24 catties per month in 1963, based on Chinese figures of grain production. All reports, from scholars and refugees alike, indicate that since 1963 the rice rations have in fact increased.

estimate of the rice rations (in catties/month) for the peasants in June of 1965. The opinion was elicited under conditions of verbally guaranteed anonymity and removal of the inducement. Further questions relevant to the task were then asked of the subjects and the responses recorded.

a. Experimental Context

Fifty subjects participated in the experiment. All were refugees from Communist China who had left the mainland since 1959; all were over twenty years of age and literate. Ninety percent of the subjects were males.

The subjects were initially enlisted to participate in a one and one-half hour anonymous interview about their daily life activities while on the mainland, the interview concentrating on their mass media habits. The experimenter was introduced as a research scholar working on his doctoral dissertation for an American university. All interviewing and instructing for the experiment was done through a Chinese interpreter, who was presented as the experimenter's assistant. These were the only two persons present during the experiment, besides the individual subject. The setting was a business office in downtown Kowloon maintained by the experimenter for the purpose of his research work.

The fifty subjects were randomized among control group, low inducement group, and high inducement group by writing 20 C's, 15 L's and 15 H's on slips of paper, placing them in a canister

and shaking it. The order in which the lettered slips were withdrawn from the canister determined which group each of the fifty consecutive subjects would be placed in. Two subjects were lost from the experiment by refusal to participate: one from the low inducement group and one from the high. The specific instructions given to subjects in each of the three groups are as follows.

b. Control Group:

Subject simply gives his honest opinion of the estimated level of rice rations in June 1965. Upon finishing the last question of the questionnaire the Experimenter explains that he is also working on some other research that is unrelated to the interview. E would appreciate the subject's help in this matter. E goes on to explain that:

"I am writing an article for an American magazine on Chinese refugee opinions on the changing situation of the peasants' rice rations in China. On the basis of interviews with about 100 Chinese refugees from Kwangtung Province, I have been able to estimate that in 1963 the average peasant man received a rice ration of 24 catties per month. But I estimate that in 1961 this same average peasant man was receiving a rice ration of only 18 catties per month, which is 25% less than his 1963 ration. In fact, there was a famine in China in 1961. So I know the situation has been changing, but I don't know how it will change in the future or how much it will change.

"Now I wish you would help me out by giving me your informed opinion as a Chinese refugee on what this typical peasant man's rice ration is likely to be in 1965. I won't use your name, but

I will take your opinion as representative of refugee opinion. Please think carefully and give me your considered and objective estimate.

"The extra time these questions take is more than we bargained for, so for your cooperation during the extra fifteen minutes this will take I want to express my appreciation with this small token."

E then shows lantern to subject and places it on the desk before him. E then retires from the room. After S has considered well and given his estimate of the rice ration for 1965, the Assistant records the subject's estimate on a prepared mimeographed sheet and proceeds to ask two more questions allegedly to improve the interview procedure for the future.

First of all the subject is asked to evaluate six factors as to what direction each will affect the rice rations (to increase, to remain the same, to decrease) and as to how important (on 7-point scale) an influence on the rice rations each factor will be. The factors are the following: population changes; relative emphasis of the regime on agriculture versus industry; management of socialist construction by the regime; will of the peasants to work for the regime; the export-import trade of food stuffs with foreign countries; and the effect of natural weather conditions. The subject is then asked to add any other factor he thinks is relevant, if he is able, and to assess its direction and importance. Secondly, the subject is asked to estimate (in Hong Kong Dollars) the value of the lantern and the value of the radio. When the subject has completed this he is ushered to the door by the assistant where he meets E and is thanked for his participation. The Subject leaves the office.

c. Treatment Groups: Subject makes statements into tape recorder contrary to refugee opinion before giving sincere, anonymous estimate of rice rations in 1965.

(i) Low Inducement Group

Upon finishing the last question of the interview, E explains that he is working on some other research that is unrelated to the interview. E would appreciate the subject's help in this matter. E goes on to explain:

"I am writing an article for an American magazine on Chinese refugee opinions on the changing situation of the peasants' rice rations in China. On the basis of interviews with about 100 Chinese refugees from Kwangtung Province, I have been able to estimate that in 1963 the average peasant man received a rice ration of 24 catties a month. But I estimate that in 1961 this same average peasant man was receiving a rice ration of only 18 catties per month, which is 25% less than his 1963 ration. In fact, there was famine in China in 1961. So I know that the situation has been changing, but I don't know how it will change in the future or how much it will change."

Here the procedure begins to differ from the control group.

"Now, of course, there are two sides to every story. I need to present both sides and to help me write a convincing article, I need the help of refugees who have actually lived in China in recent years and who are representative of refugee opinion. What I want you to do is follow the outline I have here (hand outline) and present a convincing argument for the side of the story that says the food supply will decrease

radically in the next few years.

"For the extra time it takes you, I want to show my appreciation with this little token (E shows lantern to subject). This will only take about a half an hour." E moves to tape recorder to prepare it.

"Now, please follow this six point outline and talk into the tape recorder for five to ten minutes, finally leading up to the conclusion that the rice ration for the average peasant man will decrease from its 1963 level of 24 catties per month back to 18 catties a month by June 1965. Just follow the outline and fill it in with examples from your own personal experience in China and that of your friends, finally coming to the conclusion of 18 catties per month for the 1965 peasant rations. In your presentation into the tape recorder be as original and creative as you can so as to produce a story that is both interesting and persuasive." (The six points on the outline are the same as those assessed by the control group.)

E times the length of the speech and after S has completed the talk into the tape recorder E says: "Thank you! That was quite good and it's all I need from you for the article I am writing. Now just for my own interest, I am taking a kind of poll of the refugees' own estimates of the peasants' rice rations for 1965. Would you just take a moment and jot down on a slip of paper the number of catties you really think the rice rations will be then? Don't put your name or anything else on it, but just the number, and drop it in this ballot box." E shows subject a padlocked ballot box filled with other ballot-

like folded slips of paper. E then leaves the room.

The assistant proceeds to ask S the same follow-up questions asked of the control group subjects: Evaluation of direction and importance of the six factors; request to add and evaluate a seventh factor if subject is able; and request to estimate the value of the lantern and the value of the radio. Before the second request, S is asked two additional questions: "How much did you like making this little talk into the tape recorder?" (on a seven-point scale) and, after assessing the six factors, "How free do you feel you were in making your decision to give this talk?" (on seven-point scale.)

The assistant then recalls E to the office and E explains that the talk into the tape recorder was not really requested to get information about Chinese rice rations, but really to determine the effect of different levels of reward on the way refugees answer questions. To prove his point, E returns the used tape to S to do with as he sees fit. E then sits down with S to discuss the feelings S experienced during the experiment and the reaction he had to it. When the discussion draws to a close, the procedure is terminated.

(ii) High Inducement Group

Exactly the same procedure used with the Low Inducement Group is used here with the exception of the substitution of the following statement accompanying presentation of the gift:

"For the extra time it takes you, I want to show my appreciation with this gift." E shows transistor radio to subject and switches it on as if to see that it is working

properly. E then says "Your cooperation in this matter is quite important to me and my research work." S then makes his talk into the tape recorder and the same procedure is followed through post-experimental measures to termination.

V. Results

The independent variables are the groups created for the experiment. The Control group (C) made no discrepant speech and thus is not expected to exhibit any dissonance reduction tendencies. The Experimental groups (X) did in fact make opinion-discrepant speeches as evidenced by the fact that the Control group's mean estimate of the rice ration was for it to increase two and one-half catties over the 1963 level to the level of 26.5 catties per month in June of 1965, and both experimental groups concluded their arguments for decrease with an estimate of 18 catties per month for 1965.

Within the experimental groups, the Low inducement group (L) received a Chinese lantern costing four Hong Kong dollars (wholesale) and is expected to have high dissonance reduction tendencies for making the opinion discrepant speech, when they are compared with the High inducement group (H) who received a transistor radio costing thirty Hong Kong dollars (wholesale) for the same task. The High inducement group should thus exhibit low dissonance reduction tendencies.

That there was in fact a perceived difference between the

two levels of inducement is shown in the Control's group's mean estimate of the value of the lantern at HK\$4.88 and their mean estimate of the value of the radio at HK\$51.46. Thus the transistor radio is seen by the Control group to be worth more than ten times the value of the Chinese lantern. So it seems fair to say that the different treatments produced the desired effect in the attempt to create the conditions required for varying levels of forced compliance between the Control group, the High inducement group, and the Low inducement group.

The dependent variables are of two different sorts in terms of the power of the scales of measurement used to assess their values. The measure of opinion change in terms of catties of rice per month, the measure of evaluation of the inducement in terms of Hong Kong dollars, and the measure of behavioral compliance in terms of time-length of speech all constitute ratio scales and the appropriate statistic for testing the difference between the means for the three different groups is the Critical Ratio (z-score) or the t-test depending upon the number of scores in each of the groups. Opinion change and reevaluation of the magnitude of the inducement are clearly potential means of reduction of forced compliance dissonance.

The three other dependent variables assessed were measured only to the level of a rank-ordering. They were the following: first of all was importance of given and invented factors as affecting the level of the rice rations. Importance was assessed on a seven-point scale from "extremely important" to "extremely unimportant" and categorized as either tending to increase,

remain the same or decrease. Thus twenty-one possible degrees of contribution to decreasing the rice rations were created from "extremely important decrease" to "extremely important increase."

Secondly, we ascertained task evaluation as measured on a seven-point scale from "like extremely well" to "extremely dislike." Finally, we assessed felt freedom in the decision to perform the task as measured on a seven point scale from "extremely free" to "extremely forced." Assessed importance of factors and task evaluation are also potential modes of dissonance reduction. The Mann-Whitney U Test (Siegel, '56) was employed to test the number of times a score in the comparison group proceeded a score in the group under consideration in the overall ranking of the scores in the two groups. In all cases a one-tailed test of significance was made up to the level of $p=.10$.

1) Opinion Change Due to Participation in Speech-Making Task.

One way of reducing dissonance is to change one's private opinion to bring it into line with what one's public statement is. If this is true then the Experimentals experiencing dissonance as a group should give a lower estimate of the rice rations in 1965 than the Control group. The results bear out this prediction of the theory with the Experimental group's mean estimate of the rations being 2.73 catties lower than the Control group's estimate. Apparently making a speech following a prepared outline before an authority with the same point of view and arguing for a point of view contrary to one's private opinion has the effect of changing one's private opinion in the direction

advocated in the speech. This result can be due to any one of the factors differentiating the Control group from the combined Experimentals but cannot be accounted for by the Characterological theory alone. However, it may not be necessary to invoke dissonance due to force compliance to explain it. It should also be emphasized that the Control group was exposed to no argument whatsoever before making their estimates; while the Experimental groups both read through a list of factors on an outline prepared by the Experimenter and constructed an argument for decreasing rice rations from these factors before giving their own private estimates of the level of the rice rations in 1965. These results could then be attributed to a form of prestige suggestion, since the Experimental group was exposed to an argument and given the authority's point of view whereas this was not the case for the Control group.* If the results are in fact due to prestige suggestion the effect would depend on the prestige of the authority; and in traditional Chinese culture the social position of the scholar is indeed high. If the results are due to forced compliance, then the effect of attitude change would depend upon the degree of force or inducement applied to the subjects.

* Although the Experimenter's own position on the matter of the rice rations was not explicitly stated to the subject in the procedure, it seems most likely that the subjects inferred that the Experimenter was on the side that he asked them to argue for, viz. decreasing rations, and that the Experimenter's statement to the effect that "there are two sides to every story and I need some arguments for the side that says the rations will decrease" was merely a polite way of getting the subject to take the decrease position regardless of his own position.

Opinion Change Due to Participation in
Speech-Making Task

Dissonance :

C > X

Characterological:

No prediction

Measure of opinion change=private estimate of rice rations
(catties/month) in 1965.

	Control	Experimental	
Mean	26.50	23.77	
σ^2	16.03	14.31	
n	20	30	Z=2.11; C > X P < .02 for 1 tail test

2. Opinion Change and Behavioral Compliance Due to Variable Level
of Inducement

The more crucial dissonance theoretical prediction is that the Low Inducement group will show greater opinion change as a means of reducing greater dissonance for task performance than the High group. In other words, if the Experimentals changed their opinion^o to reduce forced compliance dissonance, then one would expect that among the Experimentals the more dissonance they experience the more they will change their opinion. The results do not bear out this prediction.* The Low group's mean estimate of

* Nor do the results bear out the contention of reinforcement theory that under conditions of perceptual separation of dissonance arousal and attitude measurement, the greater the reward for making a counter-attitudinal statement, the greater the consequent attitude change. It should be noted here that an attempt was made to eliminate contamination and secure a true measure of private opinion by having the subject put his private estimate of the rice rations on an unmarked ballot into a locked ballot box for the investigating scholar's private poll, all while the investigator was out of the room.

the rice ration is only 0.20 catties lower than the High group's mean estimate and a difference of this magnitude would be expected 44 times out of 100 by chance alone. ($Z=0.44$)

Opinion Change Due to Variable Level of
Inducement

Dissonance: $H > L$

Characterological: $H = L$

	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
Mean	23.67	23.87	Private estimate of rice rations in catties per month.
62	10.76	17.85	
n	15	15	

$Z=0.44$
 $P=.44$ for 1 tail
test=N.S.

The Characterological theory predicted no difference in opinion change between the Lows and the Highs, but it does predict that the High Inducement group will exhibit more overt compliance as shown by the length of their speeches. Here there is a significant difference between the Low Inducement group and the High Inducement group as the Characterological theory predicts: The High Inducement group talked an average of 1.55 minutes longer than did the Low Inducement group. ($t=1.44$; $P<.10$)*

*It should be noted that Rosenberg ('64) found no clear pattern of inter-group differences in the content of the counter-attitudinal essays employed by the subjects in his experiment. Taking the number of words per essay as the best available objective index of the effort expended by each S he found a significant difference ($P<.05$) between the \$0.50 and \$1.00 groups with the \$1.00 group writing the longer essay; but no such difference is found between the \$1.00 and \$5.00 groups ($P<.70$). Our experimental inducements are more similar to the latter and larger monetary difference between treatment groups.

Behavioral Compliance Due to Variable Level of Inducement

Dissonance: No prediction

Characterological: $H > L$

Measure of performance: Duration of talk (minutes)

	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
Mean	3.50	5.05	$t=1.44$
s^2	3.98	3.98	$H > L$;
n^*	5	11	$P < .10$ for 1 tail test.

3. Invention of Supporting Arguments Due to Variable Level of Inducement

Just as opinion change is one way of reducing dissonance between private opinion and discrepant public statement, another means of reducing this dissonance is by recalling or inventing cognitions which are consonant with the public position one has taken, since one has committed himself to this position. Thus dissonance theory would predict that the greater the dissonance, the more likely it is that one would produce arguments that are consonant with the public position one has taken, and the more likely it is that one would produce arguments he judges as important to the issue. Thus, following the giving of the speech, the Low Inducement group should recall or invent more and more important arguments for the position that the rice rations will

* The smaller n in these and later comparisons is not due to the removal of subjects in analysis. Rather it is due to lack of time to record the responses for some of the subjects in the experimental situation and this omission occurred randomly.

decrease than should be the case for the High Inducement group. The Control group, having no dissonance, should produce the least number of such arguments.

Here the Characterological theory makes the opposite prediction. The High Inducement group, to comply with the authority, should invent or recall more and more important arguments for the public position than the Low group. The Control group, unaware of the authority's position, should produce the least amount of such arguments.

Invention of Supporting Arguments Due to Variable
Level of Inducement

Dissonance: $L > H > C$
 Characterological: $H > L > C$
 Measure of Addition of Supporting (ration decreasing)
 Factor to Argument in Terms of Direction and Assessed
 Importance

	Control	Experimental	
U	140.5	75.5	$X > C$
Rank	153.5 (153.5)	311.5	$P < .05$ for 1
n	12	18	tail test
	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
U	60.5	19.5	$H > L$
Rank	55.5 (101.5)*	115.5 (210.0)	$P < .05$ for 1
n	8	10	tail test
	Control	Low Inducement	
U	46.0	50.0	N.S.
Rank	128.00	82.00	$P > .10$ for
n	12	8	1 tail test

*Key: (nnn.n) = position in overall ranking of the three groups.

The results lend support to the Characterological prediction in opposition to the Dissonance prediction. The High Inducement group produces significantly more and more important supporting arguments ($U=19.5$; $P<.05$.) However, a comparison of the Low Inducement group with the Control group shows no significant difference in the production of supporting arguments. This may be due to the fact that both the Low group and the Control group received the same amount of reward; and the Control group may by this point in the procedure have discovered the authority's position by observing a positional bias in the six factors presented for assessment.

Reasoning along the same lines, dissonance theory would lead one to expect that the Experimentals would assess the six prepared factors they gave in their public statement as being more important factors in contributing to the decrease of the rations than the Control group who made no such public statement committing them to these factors as contributing to decrease of the rations. Accordingly, the Low group should assess the factors as more important to decrease than the Highs. The Characterological theory makes no prediction here, since it is hard to conceive of re-evaluation of prepared factors as compliance with authority when the authority has not requested re-evaluation. The results do not lend any support to the dissonance prediction. There is no significant difference in the summated assessed importance of the six factors between the Controls and Experimentals, nor between the Highs and Lows. ($P>.10$).

Reassessment of Combined Six Factors Affecting
Rations Due to Variable Level of Inducement

Dissonance: $L > H > C$

Characterological: No prediction

Measure: Assessment of All Given Factors as Contributing
to Decrease of Rations in Terms of Direction
and Assessed Importance.

	Control	Experimentals	
U	91.0	89.0	
Rank	134.0	301.0	
n	9	20	N.S. P > .10 for 1 tail test
	Low Reward	High Reward	
U	39.5	59.5	
Rank	104.5 (147.5)	105.5 (153.5)	
n	9	11	N.S. P > .10 for 1 tail test

4. Evaluation of Task Due to Variable Level of Inducement

Yet another means of dissonance reduction is persuading one-self that one is engaged in a disliked task because one really enjoys such a task. Making an opinion-discrepant speech into a tape recorder is presumably a distasteful task. Thus, dissonance theory predicts that the greater the dissonance, the more likely is one to reduce that dissonance by expressing liking for the task. The Characterological theory makes no prediction of differences between the Low Inducement group and the High Inducement group. The tabulations of degree of liking for the task are shown below. It is apparent that there is little consensus within the two groups, with the modal response being neutrality, but that the remaining bulk of the ratings lie on the dislike side of neutrality for both groups.

Expressed Evaluation of Task

	Low Inducement	High Inducement
Like extremely well	1	0
Like very well	0	1
Like well	2	2
Neutral	6	6
Much dislike	5	5
Very much dislike	3	0
Extremely dislike	0	0
No answer	1	1
	15	15

The distributions are practically identical; and this is borne out in the statistical comparison which shows no significant difference between the Low and the High groups on expressed liking for the task. ($U=83.5$; $P>.10$) These results do not support the dissonance theoretical prediction.

Evaluation of Task Due to Variable Level of Inducement

Dissonance: $L > H$

Characterological: No prediction

Measure of Liking

	Low Inducement	High Inducement
U	83.5	112.5
Rank	202.5	203.5
n	14	14

(invert)
low score
implies
high liking
N.S.
 $P > .10$ for 1
tail test

5. Re-evaluation of Inducement Due to Task Participation

Finally, one can reduce dissonance due to forced compliance by magnifying the value of the inducement used to get one to engage in the opinion discrepant task. As if to say in this case "I did it because I was well paid." Thus one would expect that the Low Inducement group, having high dissonance, would estimate the value of the lantern higher than would the Control group with no dissonance. Further, one would expect that the High Inducement group, having low dissonance but still some dissonance, would estimate the value of the radio somewhat higher than would the Control group.

Re-evaluation of Inducement Due to Task Participation

Dissonance: $L > C$ (on lantern)
 $H > C$ (on radio)

Characterological: No prediction
 $C > H$ (on radio)

Measure of Magnifying Inductive force: Evaluation of
 Gifts (in Hong Kong dollars)

<u>Lantern:</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>Low Inducement</u>	
Mean	4.88	8.17	$t=3.29$
s^2	2.70	2.70	$L > C$
n	16	3	$P < .01$ for 1 tail test
<u>Radio:</u>	<u>Control</u>	<u>High Inducement</u>	
Mean	51.46	38.00	$t=1.14$
s^2	437.93	437.93	N.S.
n	13	4	$P > .10$ for 1 tail test

The results bear out the prediction for the Low Inducement group. The Low group's mean evaluation of the lantern is HK\$3.29 higher than the Control group's evaluation ($t=3.29$; $P < .01$) The

results do not bear out the prediction for the High group. In fact the tendency, though not statistically significant, is in the opposite direction, with the Control group's mean evaluation of the radio being HK\$13.46 higher than the High group's ($t=1.14$; $P>.10$).

To explain the significant difference between the Control group's evaluation of the lantern and that of the Low Inducement group it is not necessary to see this as an attempt to reduce dissonance due to forced compliance. Dissonance theory offers another explanation which we may term "work dissonance." The Low group exerted a great deal of effort in preparing a speech, giving that speech into a tape recorder, and putting themselves on record in a potentially hostile environment; all tasks which the Control group did not perform. Thus the Low group exerted a great deal of effort for an inappropriately miniscule reward; one would expect dissonance to be created between expending a large amount of energy and receiving a small reward. One way of reducing this "work of dissonance" is by magnifying the value of the reward received for one's efforts (Festinger, '61).

However, further examination of the data reveals a tendency not explainable with any derivation from dissonance theory. The High Inducement group who did not receive the lantern for their efforts evaluate it as being worth significantly more (HK\$8.36) than the combined Low and Control groups who did receive the lantern for their efforts ($t=5.76$; $P<.001$). If the subjects conceived of themselves as having had a choice between the two gifts, dissonance theory would have predicted just the opposite, namely those who received a given gift following acceptance should magnify the value of the gift received and diminish the perceived

value of the gift not received.

Data Expanded for Characterological Theory

Lantern:	Control	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
Receive	4.98	8.17	--	Prediction
Not Receive	--	--	13.75	$H > (C+L)$

	C+L	High Inducement	
Mean	5.39	13.75	$t=5.76$
s ²	6.95	6.95	$H > (C+L)$
n	19	4	$P < .001$ for 1 tail test

Radio:	Control	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
Receive	--	--	38.00	Prediction
Not Receive	51.46	50.00 (2)	--	$(C+L) > H$

	C+L	High Inducement	
Mean	51.27	38.00	$t=1.19$
s ²	389.6	389.6	N.S.
n	16	--	$P > .10$ for 1 tail test

The same tendency to magnify the value of the gift one did not receive is noted in the evaluation of the radio. The mean evaluation of the radio for the combined Low and Control groups is HK\$13.27, higher than that of the High group ($t=1.19$; $P>.10$). The difference is not statistically significant, however. The Characterological explanation for this tendency is that the subjects were attempting to prove that they did not participate in the task for financial remuneration by upgrading the value of the gift not received or downgrading the value of the gift they did receive. It should be pointed out that "telling lies for

personal profit" is an explicitly defined means of "losing face", and this should be particularly worrissome when that lie is to show discredit to the economic capability of one's own nation, to which loyalty is a virtue.

Thus, in both cases, the tendency to reduce "work dissonance" and the tendency to exhibit lack of financial interestedness work against each other and tend to cancel each other out. Only in the case of the evaluation of the radio is the resultant variability sufficiently large to mask statistical significance for either tendency.

If the subjects are reducing forced-compliance dissonance by magnifying the inducement used to get them to engage in making an opinion-discrepant speech, then one might expect that those with greater dissonance would be more likely to rate their decision to engage in the task as more forced and less free than those with low dissonance. The distribution of scores, in answer to such a question is shown below.

Expressed Degree of Freedom in Decision to Participate
in Task

	Low Inducement	High Inducement
Extremely free	0	0
Very free	5	2
Free	1	7
Neutral	4	6
Forced	4	0
Very forced	0	0
Extremely forced	0	0
No answer	1	0

Total

15

15

Inspection of the distributions for the two groups shows both to be more on the "free" side in answer to the question, with only the Low group having any subjects on the forced side. However, statistical comparison of the relative rankings of the two groups shows no significant difference between them ($U=91.5$; $P>.10$). Thus expression of coercion as a reason for participation is not confirmed here as a means of reducing greater forced compliance dissonance.

Expressed Degree of Freedom Due to Level of Inducement

Dissonance: $L < H$

Characterological: No prediction

Measure of Felt Freedom in Task

	Low Inducement	High Inducement	
U	91.5	118.5	(invert-low score implies high freedom)
Rank	223.5	211.5	N.S.
n	14	15	$P>.10$ for 1 tail test

Post-experimental Impressions of Subjects

Following all experimental manipulations including delivering the experimental questionnaire and returning the speech tape to the subjects with accompanying denouement, we interviewed 18 of our 30 experimental subjects in an effort to obtain their impressions of the experiment. We were interested in two of these impressions in particular: did the subjects accept the Experimenter's professional intention as his true intention in persuading them to make a speech about decreasing

rice rations in China; and what conflict, if any, did the subjects experience in the course of the experiment.

Some of our subjects were suspicious.*Of the 18 subjects asked, 28% indicated some suspicion that the Experimenter's reasons for requesting the speech on decreasing rice rations were ulterior to the purpose given to them, viz. academic research for a scholarly article on the changing situation of the rice rations in China. For obvious reasons, none were suspicious that this was really a psychological experiment. Some were suspicious because the argument outline was prefabricated and the conclusion stated before the subject thought about it and had a chance to draw his own conclusions--this, they thought, was poor research procedure. Others were suspicious that their speeches would be broadcasted as American propaganda.

It should be emphasized that our experiment exhibited none of the characteristics making for standard "evaluation apprehension" on the part of a subject before a psychological investigator that Rosenberg ('64) points out as a contaminant of traditional classroom experimentation. To back up this assertion we point out that 30% of the 10 subjects interviewed from the High Inducement group indicated some suspicion; and 25% of the 8 subjects in the Low Inducement group also indicated suspicion. The similarity of these percentages gives little support in our case to Rosenberg's assertion that there is more suspicion as

*As we have previously noted in our exposition of the Characterological theory, Chinese maintain a cognitive distinction between overt formalism and inner emotion. As a corollary to this proposition in assessing the motives of others, Chinese tend to look behind the form of a situation for the governing material forces.

to the true purposes of experiments on counter-attitudinal actions in the high reward groups than in the low reward groups.

What effect does this suspicion have on attitude change due to counter-attitudinal speech making? Recall that dissonance theory predicted that there would be greater attitude change in the Low Inducement group as compared with the High Inducement group; whereas Reinforcement theory predicted just the opposite. Our results of no difference between the High and the Low groups supported neither of these assertions for Chinese; but the fact that we did find a difference between the combined High and Low groups when compared with the controls was attributed to the effect of prestige suggestion by an informed scholar. Now prestige suggestion depends on two things. First of all, the communicator's position on the matter must be relayed to the audience. Unfortunately we do not have any data as to the subjects' estimates of the Experimenter's own position on the matter of the rice rations; but, as we have pointed out, it seems quite reasonable to assume that the subjects' inferred the communicator's position to be identical with that position for which he had prepared arguments and for which he arbitrarily requested that they conclude as the estimated level of the rice rations in China in 1965. Secondly, the communicator must have unimpaired prestige. The Experimenter was presented as a high prestige person in Chinese culture, viz. a research scholar. If the attitude change observed between the Control group and the combined Experimental groups was in fact due to prestige suggestion, one would expect any impairment of the Experimenter's prestige role would tend to decrease this effect. The attribution of motives to

the experimenter which are ulterior to scholarly research would, of course, be indicative of his diminished prestige as a scholar in the eyes of the subjects. Our interview results bear out this contention. The 5 subjects indicating suspicion have a mean estimate of the rice rations at 27.6 catties; whereas the 13 subjects indicating no suspicion have a mean estimate of 24.5 catties. Thus the subjects who focused no suspicion of the experimenter's scholarly intentions show more attitude change in the direction of decreasing rice rations than the suspicious subjects ($t=1.46$, $\epsilon^2=12.35$; $p<.10$ for one-tail test).

About half (54%) of the 13 subjects asked expressed some feeling of conflict experienced during the counter-attitudinal speech making task. It seems surprising to a Westerner that 46% of the subjects engaged in such a discrepant task claimed they did not experience any conflict. Upon probing, the most frequent reason given for absence of conflict was the subjects' belief that "one cannot predict the future in any way." A few claimed they had previously agreed with the immanent decrease of the rice rations to 13 catties. In an effort to pin point the locus of conflict, the 7 subjects who claimed such an experience were asked when that conflict was dissipated. The responses are shown in the table below:

<u>Dissipation of Experimentally Induced Conflict</u>	
"When I gave my true opinion"*	-28% (2 Highs)
"When I got my speech tape back"	-43% (3 Lows)
"Only when I can observe the actual rice rations in China in 1965"	-28% (1 High, 1 Low)

*In a different context we interviewed a few refugees about their experiences in "struggle meetings" in Communist China where participants were induced to criticize the actions of their friends and co-workers in terms of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Here, as there, we are struck by the fact that conflict generated

If we compare the incidence of felt conflict in the High Inducement Group with that of the Low Inducement Group, Dissonance Theory would predict that it would be greater in the Low Group where there was less reward to rationalize the discrepant speech. The Characterological Theory, adducing the notion of "face," would lead one to expect that the conflict, if any, would be greater in the High Group whose members received relatively large financial reward for their counter-attitudinal statements on decreasing rice rations in China. For Chinese, the larger reward makes for more danger, if one were to be discovered, of public rebuke for telling lies against one's mother country for personal profit. Now we must qualify our results by noting that the numbers involved are too small for any firm conclusions and further that a person's report on his subjective feelings is often not a good indication of his true feelings; but the results tend to favor the Characterological Theory. 75% of the 4 subjects in the High Groups as compared with 44% of the 9 subjects in the Low Group expressed some conflict over their participation in the task. ($C.R. = 0.98$; $\phi^2 = 0.31$; n - too small for test of statistical significance). Finally, an examination of the estimates of the level of the

b. publicly espousing a position contrary to one's private beliefs is often dissipated when those other people who matter are told in confidence that the public statement was elicited by the "forces in the situation" and did not reflect the speakers' true convictions. Thus we were told that when a Chinese had criticized the actions of a close friend in a struggle meeting, the critic's conflict over his own action was dissipated when he could call or meet the target of his criticisms and tell him that he had to make the criticisms but, of course, he didn't really mean it. This mechanism of conflict reduction was apparently effective for the critic and served as an acceptable explanation for the target of the criticism.

rice rations given by the subjects expressing some conflict and those expressing none reveals no apparent difference; those expressing conflict gave a mean estimate of 25.9 catties; those expressing no conflict gave a mean estimate of 24.7 catties.

VI. CONCLUSION

Chinese reactions to forced compliance are different from American reactions to the same situation. We succeeded in creating the conditions for forced compliance dissonance. We then proceeded to measure all obvious modes of dissonance reduction, with the exception of changing the public statement to which the subject was committed. That avenue of dissonance reduction was blocked off by its presence on recording tape. We found, however, no evidence of forced compliance dissonance reduction tendencies that could not be more plausibly explained by other means. Consistent with the Characterological Theory, we did find evidence of behavioral compliance which was a direct positive function of the level of inducement and which in one instance occurred in direct contradiction to the dissonance prediction. We also found what appears to be an effort to prevent "loss of face" which occurs over and above any tendencies toward reduction of dissonance between private beliefs and public statements. In short, we found for our Chinese subjects that increased inducement produces increased compliance; but that neither increased inducement nor consequent increased compliance has any observable effect on internalized attitudes, under the conditions tested.

Not all the reactions of the Chinese we observed in the course of the experiment were different from the reactions of Americans observed in similar situations. Apparently Chinese are also susceptible to some form of prestige suggestion and they also experience "work dissonance" due to the expenditure of a relatively large amount of effort for a small reward.

VII. DISCUSSION

We do not purport to assert that our experiment has large implications for dissonance theory as a whole; we do contend, however, that the experiment has direct implications for the cross-cultural applicability of dissonance due to forced compliance. It is peculiarly difficult to infirm a hypothesis derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance because of the intervening nature of the construct of dissonance. Dissonance is a psychological state presumed to exist in the mind of the subject when his mind contains pairs of cognitive elements which are by definition and requisite empirical conditions in dissonant relationship with each other by psychological implication; most empirical evidence for the existence of dissonance between pairs of cognitive elements under requisite empirical conditions is obtained by controlled observation of dissonance reduction tendencies through one or more of many possible modes of dissonance reduction. The usual procedure in obtaining evidence for dissonance theory has been to choose an experimental situation in which a pair of the many possible cognitive elements in the situation are specified as dissonant according to some rule of psychological implication, vary the level of this a priori dissonance through the use of two or more experimental groups of subjects, and observe the relative utilization of any one of several modes of dissonance reduction by each of the experimental groups. Greater use by the subjects in the higher dissonance conditions of any single mode of dissonance reduction can be taken as evidences supporting the theory.

To infirm a hypothesis derived from the theory is more difficult. First of all, if one conducts an experiment and does not find any evidence of greater dissonance reduction tendencies in the groups with greater dissonance, critics can claim that dissonance really existed in greater amount in the higher groups but that the experimenter did not measure all possible modes of dissonance reduction and that the one the subjects might have used in this case was one of those he neglected to measure. Barring this objection, the critics can claim that dissonance really existed in the situation but the subjects have a high tolerance for dissonance and the level of dissonance created in the experimental situation was not sufficiently high to produce any observable difference in dissonance reduction tendencies between the experimental groups. Secondly, if both these objections fail, critics can claim that there was no evidence for greater dissonance reduction tendencies in the higher groups because the experimenter did not really fulfill the definitional conditions for dissonance in his experimental situation or that there were other cognitive elements in the situation that the experimenter did not consider which overrode or washed out the significance of the dissonant elements to which he was attending.

Our method of anticipating the first objection was to look for evidence of dissonance reduction in all the ways we could think of for the situation. Thus we designed the experimental situation to conform to the conditions of forced compliance dissonance and then proceeded to take post-task

measures of all obvious modes of dissonance reduction. We tested the following potential modes of dissonance reduction: attitude change in the direction of the public statement; recall or invention of cognitive elements consonant with making the public statement (production of supporting arguments); revaluation of participation in task (increased liking for task); and magnification of the inductive force. Unfortunately we did not attempt to measure dissonance reduction by seeking social support from others expected to hold consonant opinions, for lack of time and facilities. In all cases tested we found no evidence of greater dissonance reduction tendencies in the group with greater a priori dissonance, with two minor exceptions which were explained as due to reasons other than greater forced compliance dissonance. First of all, the attitude change exhibited between the control group and the combined experimentals was attributed to prestige suggestion because it was shown to depend upon the prestige of the communicator in the eyes of the subjects and shown not to depend upon the magnitude of the inductive force applied.* Secondly, the perceptual magnification of the level of the inductive force by the low inducement group as compared with the control group was attributed to an attempt to reduce greater "work dissonance," since this tendency was absolutely not present for the high inducement group and since work dissonance is a more widely validated phenomenon than forced compliance dissonance.

*Although this result was not unequivocally explained by our three propositions on Chinese national character, it is a phenomenon that is not inconsistent with our propositions and is, at least partially, culturally dependent in the sense that which occupations or qualities are deemed prestigious depends upon cultural values.

If we can agree that in our experiment there is no evidence of greater dissonance reduction tendencies in the high dissonance condition, we are still faced with the second possible objection, viz. the experimental situation did not fulfill the definitional conditions for the existence of dissonance for the subjects tested. As we have pointed out in the procedure and the beginning of the section on results we were very careful to fulfill the conditions for the creation of forced compliance dissonance as stated in the literature. Furthermore, as we have pointed out in the introduction, our experiment was designedly a replication of the essentials of seven American experiments on forced compliance, all of which have supported the empirical generalization that the greater the inducement to make a public statement contrary to one's private opinion, the less the consequent attitude change. Our results were at variance with this generalization developed from experiments with American subjects, which we can consider for the purposes of comparison of cultural differences as a sort of additional control group.*

Our conclusion is, then, that there exists a real cross-cultural difference between Americans and Chinese in their attitudinal reactions to forced compliance. We have been careful to point out that we do not consider our research an experimentum crucis for dissonance theory as a whole; for the theory as a whole is a remarkably well substantiated integrator

*Our results were also at variance with the single experiment conducted by Rosenberg ('64) in which he found the opposite tendency under conditions of controlled "evaluation apprehension."

of diverse social-psychological phenomena. What we suggest is called for is a sharper specification and definition of the rules of psychological implication basic to dissonance theory with an eye to the empirical conditions, especially cultural, under which they hold. We call into question the validity for Chinese of the dissonance producing quality of forced compliance as it is presently defined; for we maintain that this particular aspect of dissonance theory is predicated on a rule of psychological implication that is both culturally determined and different for Chinese than for Americans.

We have previously noted that some of the "follows from" relations of psychological implication basic to the psychology of dissonance theory rest on cultural rules of mores. Post-decision dissonance does not; rather its dissonance producing quality follows from logic: following a decision between two alternatives, the positive aspects of the rejected alternative and the negative aspects of the selected alternative stand in dissonant relation with the knowledge of the action taken, provided only that we assume that man acts to acquire positive values. On the other hand, forced compliance dissonance does rest on a culturally determined premise. By definition forced compliance dissonance exists whenever reward is promised or punishment threatened to induce a person to act in a way that is contrary to his own private opinion. If the counter-attitudinal action is elicited, dissonance exists between the person's private opinion and his knowledge of the action he has taken. Now suppose we have a culture in which a person's public advocacy of opinion X does not imply that

he in fact privately espouses opinion X--a culture where there is no simple one-to-one relationship between what one privately believes and how one acts publicly. We suggest that it is the admonition against hypocrisy contained in the Protestant ethic or some other cultural infusion that has made Americans and other Westerners come to believe that there should be a direct relationship between what a man believes and what a man "stands up for," or professes to believe, or acts like he believes.

We suggest that the cultural elements that mediate the relationship between private beliefs and public behavior for Chinese are the same as those that breed overt compliance without accompanying internalized attitude change in our experimental forced compliance situation. We suggest further that these cultural elements are those we have described in the Characterological Theory, viz. the subjective definition of the self-concept in terms of family and group loyalties rather than in terms of universalistic principles of identification; the ingrained habit of exhibiting extreme submission before figures of authority; and the accepted practice of maintaining a cognitive distinction between one's overt formal behavior in a situation and one's covert emotional feelings. These, we believe, are fundamental cultural differences between Chinese and American national character.

One aspect of dissonance theory that does not follow from logic, but which does appear to exhibit the property of cross-cultural invariance is the notion of "work dissonance." As Festinger ('61) puts it:

"If a person exerts a great deal of effort, or endures pain to reach some ordinary objective, there is a strong tendency for him to persuade himself that the objective is especially valuable or especially desirable."

Our experimental results tend to bear out this generalization for the evaluation of the inducement. However, one might have anticipated this result, since the same generalization has been found to hold not only for "the American college sophomore" but also for the white rat. Aiken ('57) found that holding effort during extinction constant, the results of his experiment on instrumental learning with rats show that the average number of trials to a criterion of extinction was considerably greater for the high effort acquisition condition than for the low effort acquisition condition. The assumption is that the rats in the high-effort condition upgraded the value of the reward or discovered new subordinate motive-satisfying incentives in the situation (Festinger, '62). We are forced to agree with Festinger when he says:

"Rats and people come to value the things for which they have suffered."

But now we are more confident that "people" includes another half-billion suffering Chinese.

The implications of our findings for the attitude change process in Chinese may be summarized briefly as follows. It appears relatively easy to induce a Chinese to comply overtly with authority; but it appears relatively difficult to induce a Chinese to internalize the principles advocated by the authority. Internalization seems to depend heavily upon the prestige of the authority in the eyes of the subject and it may indeed

require an intermediary stage of personal identification with the authority to become operative. Overt compliance by no means implies private acceptance, nor does it appear to engender it.

The attitudinal effects of forced compliance are very important to totalitarian regimes. The present rulers of the half billion Chinese on the mainland seem to be well aware of the futility of force in the persuasion of their compatriots. As compared with Stalinist coercive practices in extracting confession, Mao Tse-tung ('56) stresses "voluntarism." He employs a method of progression from slight to severe sanctions to elicit compliance in attempts at ideological remoulding. Mao expresses great faith in the psychological malleability of man and stresses the importance of voluntarism on the part of the target of persuasion. As a model for ideological remoulding he uses the analogy of a doctor and patient:

"In treating the case of ideological or political illness we should never resort to violence, but should adopt the attitude of 'treating the illness in order to save the man,' which alone is the correct and effective method."

Stressing the futility of force in securing the support of the people he says: "Let us transform the consciousness of the masses. We absolutely must not proceed by orders or constraints. Unless the masses are awakened and willing, all work that needs their participation will turn out to be empty formality and end in failure."

Our humble results would indicate that barring the effectiveness of force in securing internalization by Chinese of

new principles and loyalties, the effectiveness of the Chinese Communist effort in mass persuasion for socialist construction is heavily dependent upon the prestige of the cadres in the eyes of the masses. They also point out what must be a great problem for China's modern leaders, the practice of "seeming compliance." In a culture whose members have employed this mechanism before government officials under traditional distant regimes for thousands of years, how prevalent this mechanism of dissimulation must be today under a regime that reaches right down into the family and personal life of her subjects, exhorts them to renewed effort, and attempts a gigantic "transvaluation of values" in supplanting the traditional Confucian Code with the modern code of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. Let us summarize some of the conflicting and potentially dissonant elements between the Confucian and the Chinese Communist codes. The new ideology has emphasized youth over age, emancipated the female, ruled in the name of the worker instead of the literati-gentry, substituted "state" authority for father's, stressed future orientation over past, and pointed out social contradictions to be reduced by struggle, not by harmonious conservatism.

In the face of the large significance of the problem of psychological effects of Communist Chinese efforts in persuasion, a single experiment is almost ludicrous by comparison. We recommend many more. If we had our experiment to do over, we would have modified at least three things. We would have attempted to measure dissonance reduction tendencies through the mode of seeking social support from other persons; we would

have attempted to ascertain the subject's perception of the experimenter's position on the attitude issue; and we would have employed a randomized block design for assessment of the dual effects of receiving a gift of a given value and making a counter-attitudinal speech by using two levels of reward for the control group. We suggest that future experiments be undertaken which employ appeals to group loyalty as a means of inducing compliance and that still other experiments be done to study the effect of forced compliance in a small group setting. The latter may prove particularly interesting in view of the importance to a Chinese of his reference group as pointed out by the Characterological Theory. We would expect that forced compliance would be more effective in securing attitude change in such a setting. Although much research remains to be done, the use of the experimental method to test social science theories cross-culturally appears to us to be a new and fruitful method for the study of national character.

VIII. SUMMARY

In the "study" sessions, where everyone must voice his opinion on the news, a large proportion of the people clearly are induced to make statements that are discrepant with their true opinions. What is the attitudinal effect on a Chinese of making a public statement contrary to his private opinion under inducement by an authority figure? Time did not permit us to test this question for the small group setting, but if we can limit our inquiry for the time being to the effects of behavior in isolation from the group, our experiment provides some answers. In the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to three groups: a Control group of 20, a Low inducement group of 15; and a High inducement group of 15 subjects. The Control group simply gave their honest estimates of the level of the peasants' rice rations for 1965, at the request of the experimenter who was presented as an American research scholar. Both the Low and the High inducement groups made a 5-10 minute speech into a tape recorder following a 6 point outline and arguing for the point of view that the rations would decrease radically by 1965. They then were asked for their true estimates, under guarantee of anonymity, by putting their ration estimate in a locked ballot box. The difference between the Low and High inducement groups was that the Low group was presented with a small "gift" for their services (valued at \$0.68) whereas the High group was given a large "gift" valued at \$5.10.

The same psychological theory, dissonance theory, which implies that the study groups should be very effective means

of changing attitudes, also says that the lower the inducement to get a person to make a public statement contrary to his private opinion, given that he is induced to make the statement, the more his attitude will change to come into line with what he has said as a means of reducing dissonance.

A characterological theory about the unique characteristics of Chinese as compared with Westerners points out the Chinese propensities to group identification and "face saving"; to extreme compliance with authority; and to a highly developed ability to maintain a separation between an overt-formal behavior level and a covert-emotional feelings level in their thinking. This theory makes different predictions for this situation, saying that Chinese will readily comply, that they will comply more under more inducement, but that this compliance does not produce attitude change. The results came out generally supporting the characterological theory; the High inducement group made longer speeches than the Lows, and they invented more supporting arguments to their speeches. They did not, however, show any difference in opinion change, when compared with the Lows. Both the High group and the Low group evidenced some opinion change, but it is not necessary to invoke dissonance theory to explain that; they may merely have been subject to a prestige suggestion by a scholar with a prepared argument and point of view.

What now deserves investigation is the effect of controlled small group discussion on attitude change for Chinese, for this is the essence of "thought reform" for the large masses of the Chinese population today.

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13. ABSTRACT This paper is a report of experimental research on Chinese psychological reactions to forced compliance conducted by the author in Hong Kong between the months of January and October 1964. It represents an attempt to provide empirical answers to the questions posed by two mutually contradictory theories pertinent to Chinese reactions in a forced compliance situation, viz. the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance and a Characterological Theory about Chinese behavior. The former is about the tendency of people to maintain consistency between their cognitions, evaluations, and behaviors and how people react once this consistency is disrupted. The latter is about the behavior characteristics of Chinese resulting from their culture of Confucianism. The author finds that the experiment supports the Characterological Theory in general, but only part of the Dissonance Theory is supported. For example, for the Chinese and American subjects alike, increased inducement produces increased compliance. But unlike that of the American subjects, the internalized attitudes of the Chinese were affected neither by increased inducement nor by consequent increased compliance. However the author does not conclude that this experiment has large implications for dissonance theory as a whole but he does contend that the experiment has direct implications for the cross-cultural applicability of dissonance due to forced compliance.

